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What “Development” Does to Work 
Benedetta Rossi, University of Birmingham 
 
Abstract 
This article introduces an Africa-focused special issue showing that the rise of 
development in its modern form coincided with the demise of the political 
legitimacy of forced labor. It argues that by mobilizing the idea of development, 
both colonial and independent African governments were able to continue 
recruiting unpaid (or underpaid) labor – relabeled as “voluntary participation,” 
“self-help,” or “human investment” – after the passing of the ILO’s Forced Labor 
Convention. This introduction consists of two parts: the first section summarizes 
the main findings of the contributions to the special issue. The second part 
advances preliminary considerations on the implications of these findings for our 
assessment of international development “aid.” The conclusion advocates that 
research on planned development focus not on developers-beneficiaries, but rather 
on employers-employees. Doing so opens up a renewed research agenda on the 
consequences of “aid” both for development workers (those formally employed by 
one of the many development institutions) and for so-called beneficiaries (those 
whose participation in development is represented as conducive to their own 
good).  
 
Introduction 
 
What have been the consequences of developmentalism for African workers? We 
know that colonial economies were premised on the extraction of unpaid African 
labor and that European abolitionism went hand in hand with the introduction of 
new forms of coercive labor recruitment. i  What has been explored less 
systematically is how the idea of development was mobilized in response to the 
colonial state's demand for cheap labor when compulsory recruitment and 
conscription were banned.ii This special issue shows that the colonial discourse 
of development re-labeled work that otherwise could have been classified as 
forced labor (and as such would have contravened the 1930 ILO’s Forced Labor 
Convention) as “voluntary work,” “self help,” or “human investment.”iii In this 
process, certain sections of African labor were rendered invisible as workers, 
and recast as “beneficiaries,” “participants,” and “volunteers.”  
 
What kinds of work did development programs generate? With what 
consequences for different categories of workers, from “experts” to 
“beneficiaries”? What legal frameworks have been regulating the management of 
work carried out in the name of “development”? Contributions to this special 
issue explore these questions across seven different colonial and national 
contexts: Zanzibar and Ghana, respectively in former British East and West 
Africa (McMahon and Wiemers), Niger in former French West Africa (Rossi), 
Mozambique in former Portuguese South-east Africa (Kagan-Guthrie), Americo-
Liberian governments in independent West Africa (Whyte), Katanga in former 
Belgian Congo (Loffman), and Somalia in former Italian East Africa (Urbano). In 
each of these contexts twentieth century developmentalism opened up spaces in 
which African workers were classified, managed, and controlled, but in which 
they also elaborated their own strategies of self-development.  
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From forced labor to working for development: main findings 
 
The articles in this issue reiterate that colonial and post-colonial 
developmentalism was less an exercise in the politics of altruism than a way to 
entrench control over African resources and people.iv The claim to develop 
provided an ideological justification for the territorial control of regions thought 
to be resource-rich or strategically important. Colonial and independent 
governments used developmentalist logics to justify territorial claims: in 
Katanga, studied by Reuben Loffman in this issue, this happened under Leopold 
II’s Congo Free State, then in Belgian Congo and in Mobutu’s Zaire. Successive 
political elites sought to control cash crops and mineral resources. The region’s 
political instability made it a zone perceived as requiring close supervision both 
by President Mobutu, who feared revolts that would destabilize his government, 
and by the United States in the Cold War era. Development programs enabled the 
entrenchment of national and international control over this region. In a similar 
fashion, the independent Americo-Liberian government discussed by Christine 
Whyte feared French and British colonial encroachment upon its borders. 
“Developing the interior” became a way to display effective control of its 
hinterland. When independent Zairian and Liberian governments lacked the 
funding required to finance their development programs, they turned to foreign 
donors. Katanga received USAID funds; Liberia received American funding 
through the establishment of a Firestone project for the development of rubber 
plantations.  
 
In the case of Somalia, also discussed in this issue, Italy had not been a major 
colonial empire. It adopted a developmentalist stance to justify its intervention 
in fertile areas with the explicit aim of expanding Italian agricultural enterprise 
through what were presented as mutually beneficial activities, but which in fact 
made widespread use of coerced labor, especially in the Fascist period. As these 
three cases show, in different political contexts – Katanga in an “old” colonial 
empire, independent Liberia, and Somalia under “young” Italian rule – 
developmentalism enabled the entrenchment of control over regions classified 
as “underdeveloped.” This is a well-known consequence of developmentalism 
that has been broadly documented.v This special issue focuses specifically on a 
less studied question: the consequences of “development” for African labor.  
 
One fundamental finding of the studies in this issue is that development 
discourse legitimized the recruitment of unpaid or underpaid labor because 
work which contributed to development was represented as self-help. This is a 
corollary of an essential feature of developmentalism: its claim to operate for the 
good of the target population.vi This claim became particularly important after 
the passing of the ILO’s Forced Labor Convention, which coincided with the 
intensification of the League of Nations’ pressure on colonial empires to enforce 
their own anti-slavery legislation.vii The rise of developmentalism in its modern 
form corresponds to the demise of the political legitimacy of forced labor in the 
colonies. It made possible, inter alia, the continuing enrolment of African 
workers into production and infrastructure building schemes for a minimal 
remuneration. 
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The articles in this special issue reveal the systematic use of forced labor, 
including conditions that were defined by contemporary critics as “slavery-like,” 
in colonial development programs after the adoption and ratification of the 
Forced Labor Convention. Labor was used for a variety of “developmental” 
purposes ranging from public works construction (Loffman, Whyte, Urbano, 
Wiemers, Kagan Guthrie, Rossi), to food production aimed at keeping food prices 
low in cities (Loffman, Zanzibar), to the growing of cash crops for sale below 
market prices to state controlled marketing boards or private entrepreneurs 
(Whyte, Loffman, Urbano, McMahon). In some contexts, labor itself was the main 
resource of a particular region and developmentalist discourse made possible 
the continued export of workers from regions considered labor reservoirs to 
localities where labor accrued larger profits to employers under the guise of 
emergency response to famine (Kagan-Guthrie). In short, developmentalism 
made the continuation of labor coercion possible by representing work done in 
the name of development as beneficial to the workers and their communities. 
   
A second important finding of the articles in this issue is that colonial 
developmentalist regimes outsourced the coercive elements of recruitment to 
indigenous contractors who subjected workers to intimidation and fear. Chiefs 
often fulfilled this role.viii While paying lip service to respect for tradition, 
colonial developers feigned ignorance of the chiefs’ coercive recruitment 
practices. The view of development as beneficial to its recipients implied an 
emphasis on spontaneous popular participation. The idea that local 
communities, led by their representatives, were the actual initiators of 
development schemes allowed colonial administrators to deny accountability for 
the coercive methods employed by chiefs when it became harder for colonial 
bureaucracies to use forced labor for public works.  
 
Wiemers’ article traces the evolution of the relation between chiefs and colonial 
administrators in Ghana’s Northern Territories. It shows that in the 1920s, as 
District Commissioners faced both local resistance and rising international 
criticism of forced labor, they ignored evidence of chiefly coercion as well as 
popular opposition by relying on chiefs who constructed roads “on their own 
initiative.”ix By the 1930s, in the wake of the ILO’s convention, reliance on chiefs 
had become both a rhetorical cover for colonial brutality and a way to pursue 
development without much money. Administrators re-classified roads so that 
their maintenance could be justified as necessary for the benefit of the local 
community, and therefore exempt from the forced labor ban. They then claimed 
that chiefs had “volunteered” to oversee workers in schemes that their 
communities would allegedly benefit from. Concurrently, however, they made it 
clear to chiefs that resistance to organizing “volunteer” road-work would result 
in cuts to colonial development funds to their regions.x  
 
The circumstances in Barue under Portuguese rule in the early 1960s are 
strikingly similar to the ones described for Ghana: 
 
the administrator of Mungari said that “the roads cannot be repaired,” since forced labor 
had been abolished; three months later, he reversed himself, and reported that people 
had restarted working on the roads for no pay, a system they supposedly preferred 
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because they worked for shorter periods, and because “money has no value for them.” 
Other administrators similarly justified the return of unpaid road work as a voluntary 
preference on the part of residents, allegedly out of a desire to help develop their 
communities; the administrator of Macossa, for example, reported “As is customary, the 
natives have voluntarily begun repairing the pathways leading the administrative post to 
areas in the interior,” then added that this “custom” had been reinstated by him the 
previous year, and that the workers would not be getting paid.xi 
 
Kagan Guthrie adds that while “administrators were now strictly banned from 
directly conscripting forced workers […] they could, and did, pressure people 
into accepting migrant labor through the local ‘chiefs’ which the district 
administrator called ‘a sure method of reaching the objectives in view without 
breaking legal norms’.”xii Colonial administrators used chiefs as labor contractors 
and this enabled them to deny involvement in recruitment methods that they 
knew to be problematic, if not outright illegal. 
 
In the case of Zanzibar analyzed by McMahon after World War Two the Colonial 
Office received a request by the British Resident in Zanzibar to extend legislation 
that would allow the requisition of land required for food crop planting on which 
local workers were made to work and forced to sell part of the produce at a fixed 
price to feed Zanzibar Town.xiii The Colonial Office debated whether the 
requested extension would contravene the ILO’s Forced Labor Convention. To 
avoid problems, it recommended “to get the Sultan [of Zanzibar] to pass an anti-
famine legislative order and use that as cover for the coerced labor practices.”xiv 
 
Colonial administrators argued that they used local intermediaries in order to 
avoid interference into local tradition; or that the communities themselves had 
volunteered their work autonomously or at the initiative of local chiefs; or that 
exceptional circumstances such as famines or wars justified mild coercion. Yet 
undeniably these strategies enabled them to avoid paying standard wages to 
adult workers. This raises the question of what would have counted as 
appropriate remuneration. This important ethical question deserves more 
consideration than it can receive in this special issue alone. But while this special 
issue does not attempt to articulate a moral argument, it demonstrates that the 
practices carried out in the name of development were ethically dubious by the 
standards of the time.  
 
Had their recruitment practices been congruent with the ILO Forced Labor 
Convention, which embodied international normative thinking about labor 
standards, colonial administrators and national bureaucrats would not have 
resorted to dissimulation to conceal the coercion necessary to extract labor from 
workers who resisted recruitment. Indeed, when reports on forced recruitment 
in colonial development schemes leaked through the European media, they 
provoked scandalized reactions from the public.xv Furthermore, had workers 
perceived employment as truly beneficial to them and competitive with the 
earnings they hoped to access through migration, they would have offered their 
services willingly to national or foreign “developers.”xvi But they did not: they 
opposed and resisted unpaid work re-classified as participation in their own 
development, and preferred migration in search of paid work.  
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It is significant that the only case of genuine volunteering discussed in this issue 
took place in the Sahelo-Saharan region of Niger studied by Rossi. Here the 
workers employed by a project funded by Italy and managed by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) in the 1980s and 1990s were mainly women. In 
this desert-edge region adult men migrated seasonally to work in African cities. 
Due to gender ideologies, the majority of women did not migrate. There were 
hardly any paid employment opportunities in the villages where they lived. For 
the poorest of these women, who were recurrently exposed to hunger, the daily 
meal offered to workers on the Project’s worksites was a desirable 
remuneration. They willingly contributed over twelve million working days to 
the Keita Project in about fifteen years up until the early 2000s. Their limited 
range of alternatives accounts for their eagerness to volunteer work under 
conditions that most local men did not accept. 
 
A third key finding of this special issue is that migration posed a problem to 
developmentalist regimes because it amplified people’s choices allowing them to 
resist recruitment in development projects.xvii Workers who had the option of 
accessing better opportunities abroad were not available for development 
schemes unless these schemes offered remuneration rates comparable to their 
earnings as migrants. Measures to control the free movement of workers were 
put in place to support “development.”xviii Hampering mobility through the threat 
of violence was the most direct way to curtail the exodus of potential 
“volunteers.” But control over mobility took multiple forms. Where migrant or 
alien workers were available, their outsider status gave them fewer rights than 
natives or citizens. National protective legislation did not apply to them and 
racist ideologies made their exploitation appear justifiable and “civilizing.” For 
example, the Liberian state imposed slavery-like working conditions on so-called 
re-captives and “Congoes” in the nineteenth century. Alternatively, the 
emigration of native workers could be curtailed legally: in 1964 President 
Tubman’s vagrancy law in Liberia permitted the authoritarian relocation of 
workers in the interest of national development plans.xix  
 
Hampering the free movement of people was not always easy: administrators 
struggled and often failed to stop migrants from moving to conditions they saw 
as more attractive. A District Commissioner in the Northern Territories 
Protectorate cited by Wiemers pondered in 1919 about “how one is to draw the 
line and distinguish when a man is a fugitive from work or when he is an 
emigrant to better his condition.” xx  Loffman shows that in Congo the 
administration was faced with bottlenecks in labor recruitment when they could 
not legally stop men from migrating.xxi In the case of Italian Somalia studied by 
Urbano in the interwar period Italy tried to manage the problem of Italian 
migrants leaving Italy in large numbers, as well as the problem of Somali 
migration within Somalia. Italy’s national Committee for Emigration initially 
sought to direct Italian migrants toward its colonies. But when the cost of Italian 
labor appeared too high, Italy developed a plan to provide farming inputs and 
technology on Somali-owned land where indigenous workers would contribute 
their labor as a form of “shared participation” (compartecipazione) in 
agricultural development. xxii A large resettlement scheme moved entire families 
and communities to the irrigation schemes of the Società Agricola Italo-Somala 
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(SAIS), with “traditional” chiefs likely acting as intermediaries between the 
communities and company management. Efforts to curtail the mobility of 
laborers in resettlement schemes resulted in brutal forms of labor surveillance 
to stop mutinies. In all of these cases, workers voted with their feet. When they 
were free to move, they opted out of projects allegedly devised for their own 
development. Developers needed volunteers; when volunteers were not 
forthcoming, they were forced.   
 
A fourth finding of this issue is that the slow progress or failure of development 
was never seen as an outcome of undesirable employment conditions. It was 
normally blamed on the resistance and/or backwards “nature” of the natives. In 
the early stages of colonial developmentalism these arguments took overtly 
racist overtones that justified paternalist coercion: recalcitrance, resistance, and 
unwillingness to cooperate were never considered rational reactions, but natural 
attitudes of lazy or uncivilized “Blacks” who had to be coerced for their own 
good: coercion would supposedly teach them how to behave as free workers.xxiii  
 
The ideology of the civilizing potential of colonial rule was inseparable from 
practices of labor control. Colonial powers arrogated to themselves the right to 
extract labor from Africans by positing that for “uncivilized” Africans working for 
colonialism amounted to working for their own civilization. In his 1931 study 
entitled “Work and Colonization,” published at the height of French debates on 
the ILO’s Forced Labor Convention, Charles Fayet summed up colonial labor 
policy as follows:  
 
It was necessary to recruit locally a workforce without which the colonies could neither 
survive nor develop. We already mentioned that some indigenous populations in their 
current state of social evolution “prefer suffering misery and hunger to [contributing] 
the slightest effort to the improvement of their own well-being.” It was therefore 
absolutely necessary that the colonizing power use its authority to impose the 
implementation of indispensable public works. To question this right, to deny it and to 
forbid its exercise, is tantamount to abandoning colonized countries to the worst 
physical and moral conditions, and to assist in the “bankruptcy of colonization.”xxiv  
 
As late as 1944 a Portuguese Inspector reasoned that “the black is naturally 
averse to work, as he has an almost invincible tendency towards self-indulgence 
and is by nature lazy, and still has no sense of his moral duties. Thus, state action 
is necessary, because without work the life of a people becomes impossible…”xxv 
Following independence in the areas discussed in this issue, racism in official 
discourse mostly gave way to culturalism that essentialized African society. The 
racially inferior gave way to the under-developed.  
 
Is working for “development” developmental?  
 
Contributions to this special issue highlight continuities and changes in two 
intertwined aspects of international intervention in Africa, namely, labor policies 
and development policies. The section above summarizes the issue’s main 
findings in relation to colonial and post-colonial public work policies. It suggests 
that colonial developmentalism allowed administrators to manage some sections 
of the African workforce in continuity with earlier practices of labor coercion 
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that had been rendered illicit by international legislation. This section discusses 
these findings in relation to debates on the effects of “development.” To do so, we 
must first clarify how we understand and apply this notion. 
 
The notions of “development” and “developmentalism” are employed in at least 
two main ways in an extensive multi-disciplinary literature.xxvi A first strand of 
development-focused research interprets the notion of development literally and 
uses it as an analytical concept. It focuses on the developmental strategies of 
different governments and institutions, and aims to assess their relative 
efficiency in terms of economic growth and other development indicators. The 
second strand approaches “development” as a hegemonic trope in political 
discourse. It emphasizes the historical rise of a rationale in which the 
representation of certain countries as “underdeveloped,” “developing,” or “low-
development” (LDCs) has consequences for their international relations and 
standing. These two perspectives are not entirely disconnected: critiques of 
development often imply a claim that the discourse of development did/does not 
yield “actual development.” This claim presupposes some engagement with a 
literal understanding of the term. 
 
Economic historian Gareth Austin has defined economic development as the 
“expansion of capacity to increase output per capita.”xxvii In this definition 
development is an economic parameter that can be used to compare the ability 
of various countries to increase output at different moments in time. Political 
economists working with this notion of “development” seek to establish which 
state-driven institutional arrangements have the potential to maximize economic 
growth especially in poor and low-income countries. This research approach 
looks at history to draw lessons from the past and inform policy.xxviii  
 
By contrast, poststructuralist researchers advanced fundamental critiques of 
development, which they see, in the words of Arturo Escobar, as yielding 
“specific constructions of the colonial/Third World subject in/through discourse 
in ways that allow the exercise of power over it.”xxix They criticize post-colonial 
developmentalism as a fundamentally exploitative endeavor directed by 
northern powers and enabling the continuing subordination of the south.xxx The 
view that international development “aid” is a euphemized name for an 
imperialist and self-serving venture is still popular.xxxi These critiques have in 
turn been criticized for attributing too much power to northern donors. 
Southern politicians and analysts saw the discourse of development “as a 
potential source of support for national empowerment and advancement.”xxxii 
They reinterpreted it in original ways and actively promoted its implementation 
in southern countries.xxxiii  
 
Interpretations of developmentalism as purely hegemonic tend to conceal the 
ways in which African elites have been taking advantage of their privileged 
access to development discourses and funds to entrench their power, a behavior 
that Jean-Francois Bayart characterized as extraversion.xxxiv Those articles in this 
issue that extend their analysis into the post-independence period endorse this 
view: in independent Zaire (Loffman), Liberia (Whyte), and Niger (Rossi), and 
Zanzibar’s post-revolutionary nationalist government (McMahon) the presidents 
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mobilized a developmentalist discourse to justify coercive and/or exploitative 
recruitment practices. Non-elite Africans, too, have been turning “aid” to their 
own ends.xxxv  It is sometimes argued that this is what makes development a 
better option compared to alternative approaches to North-South relations.xxxvi 
But the fact that Africans – elites and commoners – have been successful in 
making policy (even authoritarian policy) work for them does not make such 
policies ipso facto benign or de facto “developmental.” The alleged superiority of 
developmentalism in terms of its humanitarian potential to effectively improve 
the conditions of poor countries and/or groups remains to be established. 
 
 In recognition of the opportunistic political employment of “development” to 
disguise labor exploitation, contributions to this special issue use the term 
“developmentalism” to signal that they do not take “development” at face value.  
They analyze critically the historical circumstances in which developmentalism 
evolved as a rationale of government. When, where, and why did development 
become a fundamental axiom of government? With what consequences – in 
particular, what consequences for the management of labor and opportunities 
for workers?  
 
Contributors do not ask whether the countries or regions they examine did or 
did not achieve economic growth or increased output per head. They explore the 
ways in which the idea of development allowed the continued coercion of 
workers. In the majority of cases, it is questionable whether such coercion could 
be deemed to have been justified by its outcomes: the extent to which the 
projects examined here yielded sustained growth and demonstrable lifestyle 
improvements for the “beneficiary” communities is sometimes unclear, and 
mostly disappointing. And, of course, most analysts today would find the view 
that forced labor or slavery were justified because they helped national 
economies to “develop” completely unacceptable. This said, our argument is not 
that development plans “failed,” but that the labor question was not posed: 
rarely did “developers” see “beneficiaries” as “workers”; even more rarely did 
they debate openly whether the unfavorable working conditions that 
characterized the beneficiaries’ participation were justified in developmental 
terms.      
 
The claim that intervention was necessary to induce progress beneficial to the 
target society legitimized the mobilization of unpaid or underpaid labor. A 
corollary of this argument is that “developers” have been represented as 
benefactors of those designated as “to be developed,” who were expected to 
participate willingly in activities initiated for their own good. Defined in such 
broad terms, developmentalism can be seen as a style of government that rises 
and wanes in different places and at different moments in time.xxxvii We can 
examine and compare European developmentalism, Russian developmentalism, 
Chinese developmentalism, Islamic developmentalism, or post-World-War-Two 
developmentalism. Did the Omani Arabs who established clove plantations in 
Zanzibar and Pemba from the 1830s on pose as “developers” of these regions 
and societies? Did the reformist elites of the Sokoto Caliphate in what is today’s 
Northern Nigeria pose as “developers” of the Hausaphone societies that pre-
existed the 19th century Caliphate? How did these endeavors differ, if at all, from 
 9 
those of Europe’s colonial empires? Irrespective of how one would answer these 
questions, they presuppose a critical distance from the mantra of development. 
Like the notion of colonialism, the notion of developmentalism signals a critical 
approach toward “development” as a self-evident remedy to the challenges faced 
by poor countries, and places “development” in historical perspective.  
 
Multiple genealogies have been advanced for twentieth century 
developmentalism. Suzanne Moon sees the Dutch new Ethical Policies in the East 
Indies as precursors of more recent Dutch developmentalism.xxxviii Antony 
Hopkins speaks of “Britain's first development plan for Africa” in relation to the 
campaign to suppress the slave trade from 1815 onwards.xxxix Joe Hodge argues 
that Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain was the first to 
devise ‘‘development’’ strategies in the British colonial empire when he served 
as Secretary of State for the Colonies at the end of the nineteenth century.xl Robin 
Law’s work on the Royal Africa Company’s plantation projects highlights early 
examples of British developmentalism in a volume that reflects on European 
commercial agriculture initiatives in Africa.xli The developmentalist overtones 
that colored these potential alternatives to the slave trade – which were 
eventually rejected – resurfaced later in the new guise of the twentieth century 
colonial “developmentalist turn.” It is noteworthy that, even though the 
circumstances were different from those examined by Law, also in this more 
recent instantiation “development” was introduced as an alternative to forced 
labor. 
 
Moving closer to the present, Frederick Cooper showed that colonial powers 
turned to development funded through national taxation when they needed to 
“find a progressive basis for continued colonial rule in an era when major 
powers had made ‘self-determination’ a slogan of international politics.”xlii 
Initially rooted in the reconfiguration of colonial rule that followed the Second 
World War, planned development increasingly shaped international relations. 
This developmentalism was a genuinely global governmental regime. It was 
premised on the idea that powerful nations ought to contribute to the 
“development” of poor nations. Not only did it operate on a global scale, but it 
also derived its legitimacy, procedures, and main ideas from the work of 
multilateral institutions. It was a constitutive part of the “internationalism” that 
has been seen as a distinctive feature of twentieth century world politics.xliii 
 
Organizations that implemented “development” multiplied: the League of 
Nations, International Labour Organisation, the various organs of the United 
Nations system and the Bretton Woods institutions, for example, monitored and 
shaped distinct spheres of imperial, at first, and then national governance. 
Following Truman’s Point Four Program (1949), the logic of the Marshall Plan in 
Europe was extended to aid to Third World countries.xliv In the Cold War period, 
the USSR and China offered African countries development models that they 
presented as an alternative to that of Western former colonial empires. As 
mentioned, the idea of modernization was instrumentalized by African 
nationalist politicians in the context of the Cold War. In this process of 
internationalization, “development” was transformed from an essentially 
political relation between the colonial state and its colonies, to a generalized 
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rationale aimed at redressing the problems of “underdeveloped” countries.xlv 
Unlike colonial states, aid donors were neither accountable to recipient countries 
nor harmed by the failure of aid policies.xlvi Development programs were 
inhabited by “experts,” “extension workers,” “peasants,” “producers,” “the poor” . 
. . these terms emphasized the developer–developed relation, conceptualized in 
technical rather than political terms.  
 
Although they lacked the accountability of political institutions, development 
projects assumed many of the state’s functions as the main purveyors of public 
services and infrastructure. They were, too, amongst the very few suppliers of 
formal employment opportunities to hinterland regions. Landing a job as 
technical officer, extensionist, or driver in an externally funded development 
project became one of the main attractions of “development” for many young 
professional Africans. This cohort of aspiring aid workers had, and has, to 
reproduce the logics of the developmentalist apparatus. Like the chiefs in the 
colonial projects described in this issue, they continue to act today as brokers 
between donors and “beneficiaries.” For southern aid workers, like for more 
highly paid consultants in the north, retaining their jobs is conditioned upon the 
continuous formulation of demands for more “development” by “beneficiaries” 
allegedly willing to participate.xlvii Although this outcome may be unintentional, 
or possibly altogether “paved with good intentions,” xlviii  the creation of 
employment for providers of aid rests on the representation of  “beneficiaries” as 
in need of “aid” and ready to “participate.”xlix This obfuscates the so-called 
beneficiaries’ identity as workers. 
 
The articles in this special issue cut across the colonial/postcolonial divide. They 
show that “beneficiaries” were rarely imagined as potentially self-ruling 
workers. This finding is not intended to idealize the ideology of workfare in 
opposition to the dependency produced by developmentalist discourse. l  
Contributions to this issue show unambiguously that the idea of free work as a 
symbol of civilization for groups defined as backwards and “not ready for 
freedom” was used to discipline African workers under colonial rule and justify 
labor coercion as necessary “training.” Readiness to volunteer work in colonial 
development schemes was described as yet another proof of advancement. In its 
nationalist manifestations, developmentalism made “working for development” a 
requirement of civic participation in national reconstruction. Citizenship 
required forced volunteering, and development work was rhetorically construed 
as an activity that would yield returns to the workers, their communities, and the 
nation. According to paternalist governments and donors, such returns ought to 
be desired over and above paid employment.   
 
This special issue’s call to de-mythologize the discourses of free labor and 
development does not aspire to denounce them as irremediably compromised: 
doing as much would amount to approaching these discourses as monolithic 
endeavors, which they never were. Yet the research featured in this issue shows 
that developmentalism safeguarded the interests of groups who occupied 
positions of power in legal and political institutions, and who used their power 
to make institutions work to their advantage.li This issue suggests that the labor 
conditions and relations engendered by development policies must be 
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scrutinized closely. It reveals perhaps unexpected continuities between slavery, 
forced labor, and “development.” Since developmentalism has not ended, these 
findings raise questions about the ongoing outcomes of “development” for 
African workers.       
 
Unanswered questions: developmentalism into the present 
 
“Development” defines and regulates labor relations through a particular logic 
predicated upon the will to improve. This establishes a power relationship 
between developers and beneficiaries that endows the former with substantial 
control over the latter. To be sure, developers and beneficiaries are internally 
diverse categories: different groups fall under these labels at different moments. 
Roles ranging from Minister of Economic Cooperation and Development, to 
President for Sustainable Development in the World Bank, to “expert” 
consultants in the many companies and organizations that facilitate the delivery 
of aid programs, to local extensionists in African villages, are only a few of the 
roles available to those whose task is to develop places or people. Beneficiaries, 
too, include entire states, regions, communities, or groups defined according to 
various criteria (eg Sahelians, women, HIV-positive individuals, etc.) What they 
share is that either they or the places they inhabit are portrayed as susceptible to 
improvement. They figure as the targets of development interventions, and they 
are usually expected to participate in these interventions.  
 
The forms that participation takes vary depending on the specific nature of a 
development program or project. What concerns us here is how people’s 
participation in development affects their experience of work and employment 
opportunities: when, if at all, are they paid for “participating” in their own 
“development”? Who is paid and who isn’t? How is participation valued in 
monetary and non-monetary terms? How is it regulated, legally? What forms 
does “participation” take? Who has access to different positions as “developer,” 
who has access to different positions as “beneficiary,” and with what 
consequences in terms of opportunities for social and economic mobility?   
 
Developmentalism today continues to generate employment for a vast range of 
people. The “beneficiaries” of these policies – the poor, the under-developed, 
those below $1.90/day, etc - are not usually perceived as workers even when 
their participation entails activities that in other contexts would be characterized 
as work and remunerated accordingly. The development studies literature 
sometimes examines the linkages between aid, growth, and employment in 
Africa.lii Most of this literature focuses on what development aid should do to 
support jobs creation in different sectors of African economies. liii  But 
development does not only support jobs creation. In some African contexts today 
“development” is one of very few – if not the only – purveyor of formal 
employment to those qualified to act as aid workers. All categories of 
development workers depend on there being a corresponding category of people 
who can be represented as in need of aid, and who are hardly ever imagined as 
actual or potential workers.  
 
 12 
In this logic “imposed development” is an oxymoron. Beneficiaries are expected 
to demonstrate the importance they attach to development by contributing 
something to aid projects and programs. In the past, this something has often 
been the beneficiaries’ work. But from the perspective of international donors 
today, unlike colonial administrators, the beneficiaries’ participation is not 
primarily meaningful because it yields un-paid labor in the target region or 
country. The beneficiaries’ demand for aid does, however, justify the production 
and reproduction of jobs for those qualified to act as developers.liv Some of these 
jobs are highly remunerated expatriate positions and consultancies. Others fill 
the offices of institutions based in places like Geneva, where workers benefit 
from privileges such as fiscal relief and subsidized access to insurance. Still 
others are less highly-paid jobs in myriads of NGOs and other south-based 
development offices. These are desirable positions for professional Africans, 
many of whom hold or seek degrees in Development Studies. Even so-called 
“beneficiaries,” whose participation has opportunity costs and does not result in 
stable incomes, see aid projects as desirable because they yield revenues and 
networking opportunities.  
 
 Official development agencies collect large amounts of data and statistics, most 
of which are freely accessible on their websites. This is a valuable service. But in 
examining this data, it is still hard to come by information on what may be called 
the “labor ratio” or “wage ratio” of Official Development Assistance and NGO 
funding. We can refer to this as the Development Assistance Wage Ratio 
(DAWR): what proportion of yearly ODA budgets is spent for wages? What does 
one find when DAWR data are broken down by nationality of employees and 
level of remuneration? How does the DAWR of national donor country agencies 
(eg DFID, GTZ, USAID) compare to that of international development 
organizations (e.g. FAO, WFP), and of NGOs? The importance of these questions 
is apparent when one stops thinking of the relations instantiated under 
developmentalism as relations between developers and people-to-be-developed, 
and rather thinks of them as relations between employers and employees. This 
special issue reconstructs the initial stages of this unfinished history. 
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